Infantry square


An infantry square is a battle formation of infantry when faced with cavalry. It was a formation described by Plutarch and used by the Romans, a development of an earlier circular formation. It was revived in the 14th century as the schiltron, in the 15th century as the pike square and again in the 17th century for mass, musket-armed forces. It was widely used in the Napoleonic Wars and was used against poorly equipped infantry later in the 19th century.

The infantry form a hollow square, facing out on all sides in two, three, or more ranks with fixed (socket) bayonets. Generally, a battalion (approx.1,000 men) was the smallest force to drill in forming a square. The unit's colours, commander, and a reserve force are positioned in the centre of the square. If the square maintained cohesion, cavalry had almost no effect on it.

Once formed in a square the infantry would volley fire at each cavalry charge, either by file or by rank. In successful actions, the infantry would often withhold fire until the charging horses were some 30 metres from the square — eventually a wall of horse and human bodies presented an even greater obstacle to a successful charge. Undisciplined or early fire could leave the infantry with empty muskets, whilst firing too late (with cavalry 20 metres or fewer) from the square, whilst more effective in hitting the target, could result in a fatally wounded horse striking the infantry ranks, creating a gap and permitting the surviving horsemen to enter the square, breaking it up from within.

Breaking the square

"Breaking the square" is a cavalry charge that breaks into an infantry square. The cavalry, if lacking artillery support, would try to counteract square troop formations by charging against them in a tightly packed mass, and attack the corners of the square — the weakest points — in close waves. Feints and false attacks to reduce the volume of fire would also be used. Breaking the square usually results in the total annihilation of the infantry unit since it loses its cohesion and, thus, effectiveness. Although it was every cavalryman's dream to "ride a square into red ruin", such an event was the exception rather than the rule in the history of warfare.

Throughout the history of warfare, the rivalry of the cavalry charge and the protective infantry formation lead to several definitive attempts to prove one was superior to the other. If the cavalry could catch a battalion before it formed square properly, the horsemen usually carried the day as well as the standard of the decimated regiment back to their own lines. The initial cavalry charges at the battles of Quatre Bras are good examples for this. Other circumstances that could lead to success included sudden rainstorms wetting the infantry's gunpowder and effectively reducing their weapons to pikes, or a wounded horse collapsing into the square, opening a gap that could be exploited, as happened at the Battle of Garcia Hernandez shortly after Salamanca. Cavalry charges usually encountered square formations that were ready to take them on.

While it was vital for squares to stand firm in the face of a charge, they were not static formations. Astute commanders could, in suitable terrain, manoeuvre squares to mass fire and even trap cavalry, as Napoleon and Kléber managed against the Turks at Mount Tabor in 1799. Similarly squares could be arranged in a checker-board formation to give supporting fire as cavalry broke around a single square.

At Waterloo the four-rank squares of the Allied forces withstood eleven unsupported cavalry charges. At Lützen, despite infantry and light artillery support, green French troops easily repulsed an Allied charge. Similarly impressive infantry efforts were seen at Auerstädt, Jena, Pultusk, Krasnoe, and a number of other battles. If a square was broken, as happened at Rio Seco or Quatre Bras, the infantry could suffer many casualties — although brave and well-disciplined infantry could recover even from a break-through.

Later Years

Subsequent experience showed that infantry in line could withstand strong cavalry charge, even if the line was only two men deep.

In the age of modern warfare use of the square as a defensive formation became less common. By the late nineteenth century the British army had cultivated a reputation of near invincibility in using this formation against native troops. Henry Newbolt’s poem Vitaï Lampada, which was published in 1898 and was widely taken to relate to the Boer War almost certainly describes an action against Mahdist forces in the Sudan.